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FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN:  
NAVIGATING THE NARROWS BETWEEN  
GRUTTER AND PARENTS INVOLVED 
Kimberly A. Pacelli* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Universities’ use of race as a factor in their admissions decisions has been a 
divisive issue both in the legal system and in political discourse.  Opponents of 
affirmative action have challenged racial preferences in public university 
admissions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Individuals who find themselves denied a coveted seat in a university class and 
suspect that racial preferences are to blame will often challenge their rejection as a 
denial of their state’s “equal protection of the laws.”1  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently considered whether the University of Texas at 
Austin’s use of race as a factor in its admissions system denied two white 
applicants, who were refused admission to the university, equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.2  Fisher is only the latest chapter in a long and 
complex history of jurisprudence regarding the use of race in college admissions.   
Although this full and rich history has received generous and thorough 
treatment from hundreds of scholars, this Note will consider only the two most 
recent cases regarding race-conscious admissions: Grutter v. Bollinger3 and 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (Parents 
Involved).4  Whereas Grutter permitted race-consciousness within certain generous 
parameters, many scholars have expressed concern that Parents Involved, which 
restricted racial preferences by public secondary charter schools, may signal that 
the current Supreme Court has grown increasingly reluctant to continue its typical 
deference to affirmative action efforts in higher education.  Social scientist Patricia 
Gurin, who provided expert testimony in the Grutter case, highlights the tension 
between educators and the legal system:  
Educators in American higher education have long argued that affirmative action 
policies are essential to ensure a diverse student body, that such diversity is crucial 
to creating the best possible educational environment, and that the educational 
benefits of racial and ethnic diversity on campus are not limited to any one group 
of students.5 
William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, in their extensive longitudinal study of 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011 University of Maine School of Law.  The Author thanks Professor Jennifer 
Wriggins for her valuable insight and commentary, as well as Professor Melvyn Zarr and Librarian 
Maureen Quinlan for their thoughtful guidance. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
 2. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. 
at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 4. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 5. PATRICIA GURIN, ET AL., DEFENDING DIVERSITY 100 (2004). 
2011] FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 571 
race in college admissions, describe specifically how this educational goal plays 
out in the admissions process.  They identify four main goals that admissions 
officers have in deciding among applicants, including a desire to “assemble a class 
of students with a wide diversity of backgrounds” in order to provide students with 
a richer classroom experience than that provided by the curriculum alone.6  
Educators argue, therefore, that using affirmative action in college admissions 
allows them to admit as diverse a class as possible in order to improve educational 
outcomes for all students. 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin provides the first opportunity since 
Parents Involved to explore what that case might mean for university admissions.  
Fisher presents a novel question regarding affirmative action-based Equal 
Protection challenges because the University’s acknowledged use of race for some 
applicants in its admissions system operates alongside the legislatively-mandated 
race-neutral Top Ten Percentage Plan, which guarantees admission to all graduates 
of Texas public high schools finishing near the top of their class, effectively 
boosting enrollment of students of color without explicit use of racial preferences.  
Fisher presents for the first time the question of whether the success of a race-
neutral alternative for admitting some students of color demands that a university 
abandon the use of race as a factor in the admission of other students.  It also 
provides a first opportunity to test the hypothesis that Parents Involved signaled the 
Court’s unwillingness to continue its deference to higher education administrators 
in their pursuit to achieve campus diversity through racial preferences. 
This Note will focus on the second prong of typical strict judicial scrutiny of 
racial classifications.7  The Supreme Court has held that, “racial classifications . . . 
must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to 
further that interest.”8  This Note will focus on the second prong of this test: 
whether the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race is narrowly tailored enough 
to pass constitutional muster.9  In Part II, this Note will discuss the evolving 
jurisprudence before Fisher, focusing primarily on Grutter and Parents Involved.  
In Part III, this Note will contemplate the implications of Parents Involved for the 
future of race-conscious college admissions. In Part IV, this Note will examine 
specifically the Fisher decision and appeal.  Finally, in Part V, this Note will 
analyze the underlying opinions issued by the District Court and the Fifth Circuit.10  
                                                                                                     
 6. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 23-24 (1998). 
 7. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court held that the standard of review 
when racial classifications are challenged under the equal protection clause is the highest level of 
review, commonly coined “strict scrutiny.”  488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (O’Connor, J.). 
 8. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)).  The Court subsequently rearticulated the rule in the 
admissions context: the university must prove that its “use of race in its current admissions program 
employs ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’”  Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227). 
 9. The first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, whether the goal of racial diversity within the 
University is a “compelling government interest” is treated extensively in both Fisher as well as in other 
cases, but lies outside the scope of this Note.  See Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 601-09. 
 10. The Fifth Circuit’s decision was rendered immediately before this Note was published.  
Therefore, although this Note endeavors to integrate some analysis of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, more 
extensive analysis is needed to fully gauge its impact on Grutter. 
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Finally, this Note concludes that both courts have protected racial preferences in 
college admissions by predominantly resting their analyses on Grutter rather than 
Parents Involved. 
II.  THE ROAD TO FISHER 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin is only the most recent legal challenge 
of the use of race in the context of admissions to educational institutions.11  In fact, 
the Supreme Court’s first consideration of racial preferences to aid persons of 
color, rather than disadvantage them, occurred in the context of preferential 
admissions treatment.12  Placing Fisher in historical context requires a review of 
four significant cases:  Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,13 Hopwood 
v. Texas,14 Grutter v. Bollinger, and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1.  All four cases contemplate the use of racial 
classifications in school admissions decisions and create the legal ambiguity 
surrounding narrow tailoring that the plaintiffs seek to leverage in Fisher. 
A.  Bakke and Hopwood: Texas Becomes Ground Zero 
The United States Supreme Court first evaluated whether the use of race by 
colleges violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when 
it decided Regents of the University of California v. Bakke in 1978.  In Bakke, the 
Court considered whether a public medical school violated the Equal Protection 
Clause when it set aside a certain number of seats for students from specified 
minority groups.15  The Court first determined that because racial and ethnic 
distinctions are inherently suspect, the Court must apply “the most exacting judicial 
examination.”16  Applying strict scrutiny,17 the Court held that a university’s stated 
goal of achieving a diverse student body could be a compelling government 
interest,18 but that the use of racial quotas was not narrowly tailored to satisfy strict 
                                                                                                     
 11. The jurisprudence regarding race in higher education is extensive and complicated and has 
received extensive descriptive and analytical treatment by hundreds of authors.  See, e.g., Charles J. 
Russo & William E. Thro, Higher Education Implications of Parents Involved in Community Schools, 
35 J.C. & U.L. 239 (2009). 
 12. Hannah L. Weiner, The Subordinated Meaning of “Color-Blind”: How John Marshall Harlan’s 
Words Have Been Erroneously Commandeered, 11 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 45, 67 (2009).   
 13. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 14. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).  Hopwood is a Court of Appeals opinion, but its significance both 
to the national landscape of college admissions as well as to the University of Austin merits its inclusion 
alongside Supreme Court cases. 
 15. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-70 (Powell, J.). 
 16. Id. at 291. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 311-12.  The Bakke opinion was authored by Justice Powell; however, there was extensive 
disagreement on the Court at the time about the interaction between the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Civil Rights Act.  Therefore, the structure of the Bakke opinion raises a question of whether it is binding 
precedent on the issue of whether student diversity could be a compelling government interest.  In fact, 
the Fifth Circuit took this view in Hopwood.  See generally Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Piercing the 
Veil: William J. Brennan’s Account of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 19 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 341 (2001). 
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scrutiny.19  Furthermore, Bakke provided guidance as to how universities may 
properly consider race in admissions decisions, noting that the use of race as a 
“plus” factor in evaluating a student’s application could be appropriate.20  The 
Court envisioned admissions programs that treated “each applicant as an individual 
in the admissions process” and that looks to all of the qualities of all individuals 
and weighs them, rather than looking at race in any mechanized way.21 
Nearly two decades later, the University of Texas at Austin’s admissions 
system became the subject of the next major case regarding use of race in college 
admissions.  In 1996, the Fifth Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas that the 
University of Texas at Austin’s use of race as a “plus” factor gave minority 
applicants a “significant” racial preference and thus violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.22  The Fifth Circuit found that Bakke was not binding precedent,23 
reasoning that the diversity goals of the university were not a compelling enough 
government interest to survive strict scrutiny.24  In response, only one year after 
Hopwood, the Texas legislature reasserted its commitment to improving racial 
diversity at its flagship university by enacting the “Top Ten Percent Plan,” which 
guarantees automatic admission for graduating high school seniors in the top ten 
percent of every public high school in Texas.25  The Top Ten Percent Plan is still in 
place in Texas and is a crucial element in the Fisher case.26 
B.  The Supreme Court Reaffirms Affirmative Action in Grutter 
Although Hopwood was a Fifth Circuit decision, its holding surely confused 
the national landscape for the use of race as a factor in college admissions until the 
Supreme Court again considered the use of race in college admissions in 2003.27  In 
response, the Court’s landmark decision in Grutter v. Bollinger reestablished that 
public universities may consider race as a factor in admissions decisions.28  
                                                                                                     
 19. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (Powell, J.). 
 20. Id. at 317. 
 21. Id. at 318. 
 22. 78 F.3d at 934-35. 
 23. Id. at 941-46. 
 24. Id. at 948 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 25. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2009).  For a general discussion of the legislative 
history and motivation for passing the Top Ten Percent Plan, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of 
Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 293-96 
(2001). 
 26. Also, it is important to note that some scholars have questioned whether percentage plans, such 
as the one adopted in Texas, would even pass constitutional muster as being race-neutral because they 
are often adopted with racial goals in mind.  See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Conscious Affirmative 
Action and Race-Neutral Policies in the Aftermath of the Michigan Cases, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF 
COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: LEGAL VICTORIES, CONTINUING ATTACKS, AND NEW RESEARCH 35-
56 (Gary Orfield, et al. eds., 2007), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-
access/affirmative-action/charting-the-future-of-college-affirmative-action-legal-victories-continuing-
attacks-and-new-research/orfield-charting-the-future-affirmative-action.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2011); 
Fitzpatrick, supra note 25. 
 27. For a full treatment of the case law path from Bakke to Grutter, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke 
Revisited, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2003). 
 28. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  Grutter is discussed frequently alongside its companion case, Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), which was announced on the same day.  In Gratz, the Court held that 
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Overturning Hopwood, the Supreme Court held that the University of Michigan 
Law School’s use of race did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and survived 
strict scrutiny.29  First, the Court held that the law school had a compelling 
government interest in ensuring racial diversity within its student body.30  Second, 
the Court held that the law school’s use of race was narrowly tailored to satisfy 
strict scrutiny.31      
The law school’s admissions system included many factors that helped to 
satisfy the narrow tailoring prong.  First, the Court was satisfied that the law school 
was not using race as a quota,32 but rather as a tool for achieving a “critical mass” 
of students of color, a permissible goal.33  Next, the Court put great value on the 
law school’s articulated process for making admissions decisions, which included a 
“highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational 
environment.”34  In other words, race was only one factor, and it was not 
dispositive.   
The Court also found that the law school had satisfactorily considered race-
neutral alternatives.35  The Court disagreed with the petitioner’s argument that the 
law school could only use race as a last resort, holding that “[n]arrow tailoring does 
not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”36  Instead, the 
Court articulated an expectation of “serious, good faith consideration of workable 
race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity that the university seeks.”37  
This standard, which arguably granted much deference to the law school in how to 
achieve its diversity goals, would become an important point of contention in 
future cases, including Fisher.  Notably, the Grutter opinion ended with the hope 
that within twenty-five years, the use of a race-based factor in admissions systems 
would no longer be necessary to further a university’s interest in campus 
diversity.38 
In order to properly understand the context of Fisher, a brief discussion of 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter is helpful because it foreshadowed issues that 
                                                                                                     
the University of Michigan’s use of race as a factor in its undergraduate admissions system did not 
satisfy strict scrutiny because the use of race was too mechanical and inflexible to satisfy the narrow 
tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.  539 U.S. at 251.  Under the system, all students who were identified as 
a part of a minority group were given a twenty-point bonus out of the 100 points needed to guarantee 
admission.  Id. at 255, 270. 
 29. See generally Ann Mallatt Killenbeck, Bakke, With Teeth?: The Implications of Grutter v. 
Bollinger in an Outcomes-Based World, 36 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2009) (arguing that Grutter went farther than 
Bakke by placing stricter obligations on universities). 
 30. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.  The Court was highly deferential to the University’s determination of 
what constitutes an educational benefit afforded by a racially diverse campus, and based its reasoning 
primarily on First Amendment academic freedom rights. 
 31. Id. at 334-40. 
 32. Id. at 335. 
 33. Id. at 335-36. 
 34. Id. at 337. 
 35. Id. at 339. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 343. 
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later arose in both Parents Involved and Fisher.39  Although Justice Kennedy 
endorsed diversity as a compelling government interest in Grutter,40 he insisted that 
the Court’s extreme deference to the law school as to the proper means to achieve 
diversity abandoned strict scrutiny and did not satisfy the narrow tailoring prong.41  
Justice Kennedy argued that “[t]he Court confuses deference to a university’s 
definition of its educational objective with deference to the implementation of this 
goal.”42  Justice Kennedy also questioned the meaningfulness of the difference 
between the quotas struck down in Bakke and the law school’s methods of 
achieving a “critical mass,” expressing suspicion about the genuineness of the law 
school’s assurances that it was not really just implementing quotas under another 
name.43 
C.  Parents Involved Changes the Landscape Again 
Although Grutter is the most recent Supreme Court case to consider racial 
preferences in higher education, the Court recently revisited similar questions in the 
context of public secondary schools.  In Parents Involved, the Court considered 
whether it violated the Equal Protection Clause to use race as a factor in 
determining student placements in public high schools.44  Parents Involved 
represents, in many ways, a contradictory view of the use of race in schooling 
decisions than the Court’s stance in Grutter and may signal a change in the Court’s 
view on these types of equal protection challenges.   
In Parents Involved, the Supreme Court was asked to review the system used 
by the Seattle School District (the District) to assign students to the city’s ten 
public high schools.45  Under the plan, incoming ninth graders could choose which 
school to attend; however, some schools were more popular than others.46  The 
District used a variety of factors to place students in schools, including race.47  The 
District’s plan specified that the racial composition of each school must fall within 
ten percentage points of the District’s overall racial balance.48  Because the use of 
racial preferences was not narrowly tailored to achieve the District’s stated goals, 
the Court held that the plan was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause.49  The Court reasoned that racial classifications must only be used as a “last 
                                                                                                     
 39. Id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 387-88. 
 41. Id. at 388. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 391-93. 
 44. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 45. Parents Involved was a consolidated opinion that also reviewed the use of race by public 
schools in Louisville, Kentucky.  For purposes of simplicity and brevity, only the Seattle facts are 
discussed in this Note. 
 46. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711. 
 47. Id. at 711-12. 
 48. Id. at 712. 
 49. Id. at 711.  The school district argued that its use of race was necessary to ensure, among other 
things, the “educational and broader socialization benefits [that] flow from a racially diverse learning 
environment.”  Id. at 725. 
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resort” to achieve a compelling government interest,50 and that the District did not 
satisfactorily consider race-neutral alternatives in “good faith.”51  
Writing for four members of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts went beyond the 
narrow tailoring prong to question whether the diversity interest articulated by the 
District satisfied the “compelling government interest” prong of strict scrutiny.52  
Justice Kennedy refused to adopt this view, however, and urged in his concurrence 
that the plurality opinion represented an “all-too-unyielding insistence” that race 
could never be a factor.53  Justice Kennedy’s agreement with the plurality’s view 
on narrow tailoring, however, doomed the District’s system and became the 
important portion of the case for purposes of the challenge brought forward in 
Fisher. 
Parents Involved discusses and distinguishes Grutter in a number of ways.54  
On the one hand, the Court determined that Grutter was not controlling because 
higher education is a different context than public secondary school.55  The Court 
further distinguished the District’s plans from the admissions system in Grutter, 
where “the consideration of race was viewed as indispensible in more than tripling 
minority representation at the law school.”56  In Parents Involved, on the other 
hand, the Court found that the minimal impact of the policy on student assignments 
“casts doubt on the necessity of using racial classifications.”57  The Court’s heavy 
reliance on Grutter, largely for purposes of drawing distinctions that helped to 
invalidate the District’s plan in Parents Involved, raises many questions about 
whether the Court was signaling a retreat from the principles of Grutter or whether 
the Court truly sees affirmative action as a viable program in higher education even 
though it may be inappropriate in a public secondary school context.  
Unsurprisingly, Parents Involved created many questions about the ongoing 
viability of Grutter. 
III.  THE ACADEMY RESPONDS: DID PARENTS INVOLVED SIGNAL THE END FOR 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION? 
In the wake of Parents Involved, questions immediately emerged as to whether 
or not the Supreme Court was poised to begin whittling down the Grutter holding 
to reduce the constitutionally permissible uses of racial preferences in college 
admissions.58  The highly complex and volatile nature of the jurisprudence in this 
                                                                                                     
 50. Id. at 735 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment)). 
 51. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339). 
 52. Id. at 727. 
 53. Id. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 54. For a full treatment of the factual and analytical distinctions, including several considerations 
beyond the scope of this Note, see Wendy Parker, Limiting the Equal Protection Clause Roberts Style, 
63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 512-20 (2009). 
 55. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 722, 724-25.  “In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter, 
though, this Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher education,” such as 
expansive academic freedom.  Id. at 724-25. 
 56. Id. at 734-35. 
 57. Id. at 734. 
 58. For a general discussion of suggestions that Parents Involved signals a first attempt to weaken 
Grutter, see generally Michael P. Pohorylo, Note, The Role of Parents Involved in the College 
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area certainly raises questions about whether the Court is likely to re-examine and 
reverse its holding in Grutter.59  A large part of the scholarship in this area focuses 
on Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Grutter and Parents Involved by suggesting in 
anticipation that his vote will continue to be crucial in future cases.  In order to 
frame some of the issues raised in Fisher, this Part will briefly highlight this 
scholarship regarding the future of race in higher education admissions after 
Parents Involved, paying particular attention to the narrow tailoring portion of the 
strict scrutiny analysis.60 
A.  The Initial Vulnerability of Grutter 
For many of the reasons Justice Kennedy articulates in his dissent in Grutter, 
some commentators have argued that the narrow tailoring prong of Grutter was 
vulnerable even before Parents Involved.  One common Grutter critique argues that 
the Court was completely—and inappropriately—deferential to the law school’s 
assurances that it had “adequately” considered race-neutral alternatives in devising 
its admissions system.61  Justice Kennedy himself described the Court’s scrutiny of 
the law school’s assurances that its admissions system did not function as a quota 
system as “nothing short of perfunctory.”62  In Justice Kennedy’s view, the law 
school did not meet its burden to show how its internal monitoring of its “critical 
mass” of minority students as it proceeded through its admissions process was any 
different than the quotas prohibited by Bakke.63  Scholars often critique this 
deference to the law school’s methodology as conflating the compelling 
government interest and narrow tailoring analyses, which prior precedent intended 
to be separate inquiries under strict scrutiny.64  More specifically, the dissenters in 
                                                                                                     
Admissions Process, 42 CONN. L. REV. 693 (2009) (referencing several possible ways Parents Involved 
revises the narrow tailoring analysis, some of which are argued by the Fisher plaintiffs).   
 59. It is interesting that there has been significant disagreement within the Court about the analytic 
framework regarding race-consciousness in admissions.  From Bakke through Parents Involved, there 
were marked and stark differences among members of the Court on how to deal with race-conscious 
remedies.  Across the nineteen cases that have dealt with race-conscious government remedies (both 
education cases and otherwise) there have been ninety-two separate opinions.  Russo & Thro, supra note 
11, at 266. 
 60. The scope of this Note focuses on the narrow tailoring prong of these cases.  There is a rich 
depth of scholarship on the merits of diversity as a compelling government interest in education, which 
lies outside of the scope of this Note.  See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of 
Integration Past, Present, and Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 795 (2004).  Recall also that Justice Kennedy 
essentially refused to join the Roberts plurality in Parents Involved due to his adherence to the idea that 
diversity can be a compelling government interest.  551 U.S. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment). 
 61. Douglas M. Raines, Grutter v. Bollinger’s Strict Scrutiny Dichotomy: Diversity is a Compelling 
State Interest, but the University of Michigan Law School’s Admissions Plan is Not Narrowly Tailored, 
89 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 868 (2006). 
 62. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 391-92. 
 64. Raines, supra note 61, at 870.  But see Stoner & Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational 
Judgment: Justice O’Connor’s Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding Principles, As Shown By 
Rulings Involving College Students in the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J.C. & U.L. 583 (2004) 
(arguing that the Grutter deference to university administration judgment on admissions methodology 
conforms closely with high levels of judicial deference generally to university decisions in other areas, 
such as academic freedom, and student judicial sanctions, for example). 
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Grutter argue that the Court’s deference to the law school’s definition of its 
diversity goals should not necessarily result in deference to “the implementation of 
this goal.”65  Some scholars agreed with Justice Kennedy, arguing for more 
rigorous scrutiny on the narrow tailoring prong.66 
Although accepting that the use of race meets constitutional scrutiny, a second 
common Grutter critique argues that the Court did not provide sufficiently clear 
guidance to universities on the appropriate use of race as a factor in their 
admissions systems.67  Whereas Grutter clearly and unequivocally held that 
diversity could be a compelling governmental interest, its holding with respect to 
the narrow tailoring analysis “left substantial uncertainty” regarding how to 
evaluate whether a particular admissions method that utilized race would satisfy 
constitutional scrutiny.68  Although many schools simply adopted the law school’s 
method of individualized, holistic review, the Court provided little other guidance 
to schools whose resources and staffing levels necessitated a different admissions 
methodology than one that conforms neatly to the Grutter model.69  Faced with this 
lack of clarity, some universities are reluctant to continue using race despite the 
Court’s strong holding in Grutter, rather preferring to err on the side of caution.70  
Questions linger whether admissions systems that do not mirror closely the law 
school’s will satisfy the narrow tailoring prong.  As we will see in Part IV, this 
critique is particularly prescient with respect to the employment of racial 
preferences alongside Texas’s Top Ten Percentage Plan at issue in Fisher. 
B.  Parents Involved Raises New Questions 
The foregoing analysis bases its scholarship on Grutter itself, even before the 
holding in Parents Involved raised further questions about the ongoing viability of 
racial preferences in higher education admissions.  Indeed, some scholars note that 
both before and after Parents Involved, universities remained cautious about racial 
classifications in admissions and may have independently limited the use of race in 
admissions policies.71  Following Parents Involved, it appears that these 
universities took the wise approach.  Given Chief Justice Roberts’s strong language 
in Parents Involved—“[the] way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race”72—prudent universities will contemplate 
whether the case signals a desire to curtail deference to higher education and 
require the exhaustion of race-neutral alternatives.73  One general concern about 
                                                                                                     
 65. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 66. Raines, supra note 61, at 871. 
 67. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1478 (2005).  See also George La Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus, “Serious 
Consideration” of Race-Neutral Alternatives in Higher Education, 57 CATH. U.L. REV. 991 (2008). 
 68. Ellison S. Ward, Toward Constitutional Minority Recruitment and Retention Programs: A 
Narrowly Tailored Approach, 84 N.Y.U.L. REV. 609, 628 (2009). 
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Parents Involved is that it could signal an abandonment of customary deference to 
higher education.  A second concern asks whether the Court’s judicial scrutiny in 
Parents Involved could signal that stricter scrutiny will be applied to universities in 
the future.  The way the Court distinguishes Grutter in Parents Involved, however, 
could indicate that the Court finds that the meaningful distinctions between 
universities and secondary schools constitute a sufficient constitutional basis to 
retain the current validity of race-conscious admissions in higher education.   
1.  Is the Era of Deference Over? 
Several scholars have questioned whether the era of full deference to higher 
education is due to come to an end.74  Russo and Thro posit that the Court’s 
scrutiny of the narrow tailoring prong will change after Parents Involved, arguing 
the decision “creates a greater hurdle for officials in institutions of higher learning 
if they try to justify the use of race in the contexts of scholarship and outreach 
without first having seriously considered other approaches, perhaps such as 
socioeconomic status, that do not directly implicate race.”75  Perhaps the Court’s 
holding in Parents Involved signaled only the first wave of judicial effort to apply a 
more exacting judicial scrutiny to racial preferences and that in future cases 
regarding higher education, the Court will back away from its historic deference to 
colleges and universities. 
2.  Must Universities Now “Exhaust” All Race-Neutral Alternatives? 
Other scholars question whether the holding in Parents Involved requires full 
exhaustion of race-neutral alternatives before racial preferences may be used.  Such 
a requirement would signal a departure from the more flexible standard in Grutter, 
which explicitly held that “[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every 
conceivable race-neutral alternative.”76  Because the District did not demonstrate 
that they satisfactorily considered race-neutral alternatives, the Court in Parents 
Involved struck down the racial preferences used by the District under the narrow 
tailoring analysis.77  Some scholars have suggested, therefore, that the Court’s 
language in Parents Involved signals a desire to scrutinize racial preferences more 
closely than the Grutter Court.  Michelle Adams notes, for example, that the 
Roberts opinion in Parents Involved, which includes the Court’s holding that the 
District’s plan did not satisfy narrow tailoring, cites prior language from Justice 
Kennedy that race should only be used as a “last resort” in the context of racial 
preferences in government contracting.78  Adams argues that the inclusion of this 
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 74. Russo & Thro, supra note 11, at 268. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. 
 77. Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U.L. REV. 937, 982 (2008). 
 78. Id. at 981 (citing City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment)). 
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language signals a rejection of the deferential approach taken in Grutter.79  Parents 
Involved begs the question of whether the Court will reverse course from Grutter 
and hold that universities will only satisfy the narrow tailoring prong of strict 
scrutiny after they exhaust all race-neutral alternatives before turning to racial 
preferences.80   
Practically speaking, if the Court does require exhaustion of race-neutral 
alternatives, some scholars express concerns that universities will continue to use 
race as a factor, albeit covertly.81  By using racial proxies rather than race itself, 
universities may continue to use race implicitly to achieve classroom and campus 
diversity.82  For example, class-based affirmative action plans or percentage plans 
like Texas’s Top Ten Percentage Plan (or other supposedly race-neutral programs), 
might allow universities to seek racial diversity by cloaking their goals in other 
terms.83  As a matter of public policy, do we want to encourage universities to be 
transparent about the means employed to reach their diversity interests, or would 
we prefer that universities be covert about their diversification efforts? 
3.  Are Racial Preferences Still Permissible if Their Impacts are Only “Minimal?” 
Another area of concern contemplates what the Fisher court describes as the 
Parents Involved “minimal effect” argument.84  In Part III-C of the Parents 
Involved decision, joined by Justice Kennedy, the Court ruled that the District’s 
plan was not narrowly tailored because it only had a “minimal effect on the 
assignment of students, . . . suggest[ing] that other means would be effective.”85  
The insufficient impact of the use of race suggested to the Parents Involved 
majority that the District could have employed other race-neutral means to achieve 
the same diversification goals.86  Acknowledging the danger of its own reasoning, 
the Court clarified that although it was “not suggest[ing] that greater use of race 
would be preferable,  . . . the minimal impact . . . casts doubt on the necessity of 
using racial classifications.”87  Distinguishing the facts of Parents Involved from 
those in Grutter, the Court noted that “[i]n Grutter, the consideration of race was 
viewed as indispensible in more than tripling minority representation.”88  After 
Parents Involved, one may reasonably ask whether the traditional deference to 
higher education will be eviscerated if universities decide to use race as a factor in 
very few admissions decisions relative to their entire admissions system.  This 
“theory of insufficient impact” raises a question of whether the Court intends to 
shift to a results-oriented approach in evaluating evidence of whether a university’s 
admissions program satisfies the narrow tailoring inquiry. 
                                                                                                     
 79. Adams, supra note 77, at 982. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Andrew LeGrand, Narrowing the Tailoring: How Parents Involved Limits the Use of Race in 
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4.  Is Parents Involved Even Relevant to Higher Education? 
Despite the concern that Parents Involved could signal the Court’s intent to 
overturn or curtail Grutter, some proponents of ongoing affirmative action in 
higher education distinguish Parents Involved by limiting its applicability to higher 
education.  For example, several scholars argue that the language of Parents 
Involved may be interpreted as the Court’s recognition that there are sufficient 
distinctions between the secondary and post-secondary educational contexts to 
keep the Grutter holding intact.  The Roberts opinion in Parents Involved takes 
care to distinguish the District’s admissions decisions from the facts of the higher 
education cases.89  Scholars are left asking whether this characterization represents 
an honest distinction between the two educational contexts or if it is simply a tool 
to avoid applying the Grutter holding to the facts of Parents Involved.   
It is also possible to distinguish Parents Involved based on facts pertinent to 
the narrow tailoring analysis.  For example, one may reasonably argue that the 
Parents Involved holding simply requires a good-faith consideration of race-neutral 
alternatives.90  The fact that the District officials did not demonstrate that they had 
actually made a good faith effort to consider race-neutral alternatives to achieve 
diversity in student school assignments was an important determinant in Parents 
Involved.91  Furthermore, the record before the Parents Involved majority focused 
on the design and operation of the District’s admissions systems, and included a 
complete failure by school board officials to seriously consider any race-neutral 
alternatives.92  One can make the argument that a university that does seriously 
consider alternatives to racial preferences may be able to survive a narrow tailoring 
analysis, even under Parents Involved’s reasoning. 
Another possible view of Parents Involved interprets its holding as striking 
down a system that operated like a quota system, more akin to the types of 
admissions systems the Court has continually struck down in cases such as Bakke 
and Gratz.  This interpretation seeks to protect a more individualized review such 
as the type of admissions methodology upheld in Grutter.  In Parents Involved, the 
Court compared the District’s plan to a constitutionally impermissible quota 
system, noting that “the plans are directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, 
an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.”93  Under this 
interpretation of Parents Involved, therefore, universities are able to satisfy the 
narrow tailoring prong by showing that their admissions methods provide for an 
individualized review of applicants.  Arguably, if a university establishes that its 
use of race is more akin to the “individualized” and “holistic” review upheld in 
Grutter, than the Parents Involved decision does not apply. 
Fisher provided the first opportunity to test whether Parents Involved dictated 
a shift in judicial scrutiny over continued use of race in university admissions.  On 
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the one hand, Parents Involved seems to indicate a stricter and less deferential 
analysis of whether the use of race is narrowly tailored, which may make it more 
difficult for universities to demonstrate the ongoing viability of the use of racial 
classifications as a tool to achieve campus diversity.  Conversely, other 
interpretations of Parents Involved that focus on the distinction between the higher 
education and secondary education contexts signal the possibility of a 
constitutionally permissible use of racial preferences in higher education going 
forward.  Overall, it may be difficult to predict how Parents Involved changes the 
narrow tailoring inquiry because of its structure as a plurality opinion.  Of course, 
Justice Kennedy played a pivotal role in both the Grutter and Parents Involved 
cases.  With this backdrop in mind, we can now examine the specifics of Fisher, 
the first opportunity for federal courts to grapple with the Fourteenth Amendment 
in higher education after Parents Involved. 
IV.  FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
Fisher appears to be the first reported case considering a challenge to college 
admissions under the Equal Protection Clause since Parents Involved.  The Fisher 
plaintiffs, two white students who were denied admission to the University of 
Texas at Austin (UT), argue that the success of Texas’s Top Ten Percent Plan 
(TTPP) renders UT’s ongoing use of race as an admissions factor a violation of 
their equal protection rights.    
A.  Procedural History 
The Fisher challenge germinated from a complaint filed by the United States 
Department of Education, which determined that Parents Involved barred UT from 
the explicit use of race due to the TTPP.94  Shortly thereafter, claiming an equal 
protection violation in UT’s admissions methodology, the plaintiffs filed their 
lawsuit and moved for a preliminary injunction to order UT to admit them both.95  
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected their 
motion due to their lack of substantial likelihood of success on the merits.96  After 
the plaintiffs and UT agreed to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and remedy 
phases, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the question of 
“whether UT’s admissions policies and practices violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.”97  On August 21, 2009, the District Court ruled for UT; the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court on January 18, 2011.98 
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B.  Factual History 
For many years, UT has used its Personal Achievement Index (PAI) as its 
rubric to evaluate prospective students.  In an effort to provide a holistic review of 
candidates, the PAI supplements traditional markers of academic achievement and 
seeks to identify meritorious applicants who may not have the strongest high school 
class rank or test scores.99  Following Hopwood’s invalidation of race as a factor in 
admissions, UT ceased using race immediately as a factor within the PAI.100  
Following Hopwood and its immediate cessation of racial preferences, UT 
discovered that minority enrollment decreased immediately.101  To increase 
minority enrollment at UT, the Texas legislature enacted the TTPP,102 a program 
still used by UT.103  The TTPP did result in enrollment increases for students of 
color.  In 1997, when Hopwood first went into effect, 2.7 percent of the entering 
class was black and 12.6 percent of the entering class was Hispanic.104  Seven years 
later, after the TTPP had taken root, the incoming class included 4.5 percent black 
students and 16.9 percent Hispanic students, in contrast.105 
Despite the improvements as a result of the TTPP, UT still remained 
concerned about recruitment of students of color.  After Grutter, UT undertook an 
extensive review of diversity on campus and determined there was not a “critical 
mass” of students of color, both on campus overall as well as “at a classroom 
level.”106  Additionally, students of color reported “feeling isolated.”107  As a result, 
UT revised its admissions policy to reintroduce an applicant’s race as one of the 
“special circumstances” to measure PAI, in accordance with the new permissive 
use of race after Grutter.108  This dual methodology of admitting students of color 
through both the TTPP and in the PAI is still in place.109   
When measuring a student’s qualifications in the PAI, UT endeavors to 
undertake an “individualized and holistic” review as directed in Grutter.110  There 
are many factors that can affect an applicant’s PAI, such as demonstrated 
leadership qualities, extracurricular activities, awards and honors, work experience, 
and community service.111  Race is never explicitly assigned an independent 
numerical value itself.112  However, UT identifies race on the front of each 
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applicant’s admissions file, and the file reviewer is aware of an applicant’s race as 
he or she reads the file, even though race is not considered a “plus factor” in 
PAI.113  Instead, evaluators may factor in special circumstances, such as family 
socio-economic status, school socio-economic status, family responsibilities, 
single-parent household, English as a second language, or relative SAT scores 
compared to the average at the student’s high school.114  In other words, an 
applicant’s achievements are placed in a context that may include racial 
awareness.115  The admissions staff does not track aggregate data on the racial 
composition of the admitted class as they go through the admissions cycle each 
year.116   
Though UT undertakes both informal and formal reviews of its admissions 
system, it does not have a specified end date designated to stop using race as a 
factor in its system.117  UT has achieved considerable national attention for its 
success in graduating students of color.118  Because the admissions system has 
changed multiple times over the past ten years, it is difficult to attribute the 
increases clearly or exclusively to either the TTPP or the use of race in PAI.119  It is 
clear, however, that comparing one program against the other, the majority of 
students of color at UT are admitted under the TTPP.  In 2008, for example, 85 
percent of admitted Hispanic students and 80 percent of admitted black students 
were admitted under the TTPP.120  The District Court noted that whereas UT’s use 
of race in the PAI is akin to the “holistic . . . individualized assessment” mandated 
by Grutter, the fact that the admissions system is dominated by the TTPP raises 
questions about the constitutionality of this two-tiered admissions system.121 
C.  The Parties’ Arguments 
The plaintiffs argued that UT’s use of race violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed both prongs of strict 
scrutiny, serving neither a compelling government interest122 nor satisfying the 
narrowly tailored standard.  Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that even if UT 
satisfied the compelling government interest prong, its use of race was not 
narrowly tailored because: (1) it produced only minimal gains in minority 
enrollment; (2) it failed to consider race-neutral alternatives; (3) it was over-
inclusive because it benefited Hispanic applicants, who were not underrepresented 
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in Texas nor at the University; and (4) it had no defined end point.123  The plaintiffs 
first asserted an argument akin to the “theory of insufficient impact” argument from 
Parents Involved, arguing that the use of race in PAI was not necessary and failed 
narrow tailoring because it resulted in only minimal increases in student of color 
enrollment.124  Furthermore, the plaintiffs also drew upon Parents Involved in 
making their argument that UT failed to adequately consider race-neutral 
alternatives, noting that the use of race must only be a “last resort.”125  The 
plaintiffs argued that the overall success of the TTPP indicated that race-neutral 
alternatives were not only available, but also sufficient to meet UT’s diversity 
interest.126 
UT responded that its use of race was entitled to the kind of deference the 
Court established in Grutter.127  Because the entire judicial framework allowed for 
“flexible, nonmechanical” use of race by universities, UT plainly asserted that 
“[t]his case is governed by Grutter, not Gratz or Parents Involved.”128  UT further 
argued that its use of race in PAI satisfied both the compelling governmental 
interest and the narrow tailoring prongs.129  UT emphasized that it satisfied all of 
Grutter’s criteria to gauge narrow tailoring, in that: (1) the PAI did not operate as a 
quota system; (2) it provided flexible, individual review; (3) it included good faith 
consideration of race-neutral alternatives; and (4) no undue harm befell any racial 
groups.130  UT urged that its use of race was less burdensome than the policy 
upheld in Grutter because the PAI’s use of race could benefit a student of any 
racial group, including whites or Asian-Americans, who were not traditionally 
underrepresented.131  UT concluded that its use of race was more modest than the 
policy upheld in Grutter.132 
On the question of narrow tailoring, UT responded to the plaintiffs’ arguments 
in three broad ways: (1) it challenged the utility of the “theory of insufficient 
impact”; (2) it argued it adequately considered race-neutral alternatives; and (3) it 
sought to limit the applicability of the “last resort” mandate in Parents Involved.133  
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First, UT attempted to narrow the applicability of “theory of insufficient impact” 
from Parents Involved as applying only to rigid, mechanical racial classifications, 
rather than the flexible, individualized systems used in the PAI.134  UT also argued 
that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supported an interpretation that the 
applicability of the “theory of insufficient impact” turned on whether race was a 
rigid classification.135  Second, UT argued that its reliance on the TTPP as its 
dominant method of admitting students of color demonstrated its good faith 
consideration of race-neutral alternatives.136  Recalling that Grutter held that 
narrow tailoring “does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral 
alternative,” UT argued that the plaintiffs’ reliance on Parents Involved “last 
resort” language was misplaced.137 
Generally speaking, the arguments made by the parties to the District Court, 
repeated before the Fifth Circuit, seemed to parallel the general scholarship that 
contemplates how much of an impact Parents Involved will have on the Grutter 
holding.  Whereas the plaintiffs argued that Parents Involved directs stricter 
scrutiny and less judicial deference to universities on the narrow tailoring analysis, 
UT sought to negate the applicability of Parents Involved to an admissions system 
that achieves the type of individualized treatment of each applicant required under 
Grutter. 
D.   The District Court’s Decision 
As if signaling its eventual holding, the District Court framed its analysis by 
beginning with a review of the facts and analysis of Grutter.138  Finding that UT 
satisfied both the compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring prongs of 
strict scrutiny, the District Court upheld UT’s consideration of race in the PAI.139  
Notably, the court relied almost exclusively on the Grutter framework for both 
parts of the inquiry.140  Furthermore, in its discussion of the narrow tailoring prong, 
the court distinguished Parents Involved in several ways that limited its 
applicability to the facts of Fisher.  For example, the court found that the 
undisputed evidence demonstrated that UT did seriously consider race-neutral 
alternatives in good faith, notably through the TTPP as well as other recruitment 
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and outreach efforts.141  The court distinguished the Fisher facts from those in 
Parents Involved, where the District’s rejection of race-neutral alternatives came 
after little or no consideration.142  Simply put, the District Court was more than 
satisfied that UT had carefully considered a multi-faceted admissions system that 
included several race-neutral alternatives.143  Therefore, the ongoing use of race 
was narrowly tailored.144 
The District Court also distinguished Parents Involved under the “theory of 
insufficient impact” argument put forth by the plaintiffs.  The District Court found 
that the plaintiffs mischaracterized the Supreme Court’s analysis in Parents 
Involved. 145  The District Court interpreted the Supreme Court’s discussion of the 
“minimal effect” of the racial classifications not as adding a new element to the 
narrow tailoring analysis but rather simply evidence that the District had failed to 
consider race-neutral alternatives in good faith.146  The District Court stated “the 
question is not whether the means adopted by UT exceeds some undefined 
‘minimal effect’ on diversity, but rather whether UT has demonstrated ‘serious, 
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.’”147  In other words, 
the District Court construed Parents Involved as immaterial on this point as long as 
UT satisfied its burden of good faith consideration. 
In conclusion, the District Court upheld UT’s use of race as a part of its 
evaluation of applicants as satisfying both prongs of strict scrutiny.  In doing so, the 
court found Grutter to control almost exclusively and severely curtailed the 
applicability of Parents Involved as applied to these facts.  
E.  The Fifth Circuit 
On January 18, 2011, the Fifth Circuit issued its long-awaited opinion in 
Fisher.148  Although the opinion affirms the District Court, it reveals that the three-
judge panel grappled with the narrow tailoring prong just as scholars had after 
Grutter and again after Parents Involved.  Whereas all three judges on the panel 
saw the case as squarely governed by Grutter, only two seemed to find that UT’s 
use of race satisfactorily passed constitutional muster.149 
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Writing for the majority, Judge Higginbotham was as satisfied as the District 
Court that UT’s use of race satisfied the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny; 
however, the opinion did not distinguish Parents Involved in the same way the 
District Court did.150  Instead, the opinion expended substantial effort analyzing the 
TTPP and cataloging the myriad ways it frustrates the University’s efforts to build 
a critical mass of students of color to support its goal of classroom diversity.151  
The majority noted that, “while the Top Ten Percent Law appears to succeed in its 
central purpose of increasing minority enrollment, it comes at a high cost and is at 
best a blunt tool for securing the educational benefits that diversity is intended to 
achieve.”152  The Fifth Circuit agreed with UT that the TTPP was not “the sort of 
workable race-neutral alternative that would be a constitutionally mandated 
substitute for race-conscious university admissions policies.”153  The Fifth Circuit 
even suggested that the inflexibility engendered by TTPP, a direct product of the 
court’s own decision in Hopwood, actually inhibits UT’s ability to achieve the 
student body diversity so central to its public mission.154  Although the opinion did 
not say so precisely, it arguably falls in line with the “need not exhaust” 
interpretation of the narrow tailoring prong. 
The majority opinion also discussed the plaintiffs’ “theory of minimal impact” 
argument, though it only devoted two brief paragraphs to the issue before reaching 
its conclusion that UT’s use of race is constitutional.155  Here the Fifth Circuit 
explicitly limited the applicability of Parents Involved, noting that “Parents 
Involved does not support the cost-benefit analysis that Appellants seek to invoke . 
. . the ‘minimal effect’ [was offered] as evidence that other, more narrowly tailored 
means would be effective to serve the school districts’ interests.”156  The Fifth 
Circuit expressly rejected the argument that the some quantitative “impact” should 
become a new factor of the narrow tailoring prong.157 
Judge Garza’s lengthy concurrence foreshadows UT’s next battle should the 
Supreme Court take up Fisher.  Incorporating many of the critiques of Grutter both 
before and after Parents Involved, he suggested that Grutter itself should be 
overturned.158  Judge Garza mounted a full-scale attack on Grutter, challenging its 
deferential approach to strict scrutiny, the concept of student body diversity as a 
compelling government interest, as well as how narrowly tailored the UT’s use of 
                                                                                                     
concurring) (“I concur in the majority opinion, because, despite my belief that Grutter represents a 
digression in the course of constitutional law, today’s opinion is a faithful, if unfortunate, application of 
that misstep.”). 
 150. Id. at 232. 
 151. Id. at 238-42.  Much like the District Court, the Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion suggested that 
the constitutionality of the TTPP itself was unclear.  Id. at 242.  On this point, Judge King wrote a 
special concurrence, noting that although he concurred in the judgment and analysis of the majority 
opinion, he could not adopt the critique of TTPP, which was not briefed by the parties nor considered by 
the District Court.  Id. at 247 (King, J., concurring). 
 152. Id. at 242. 
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 155. Id. at 246. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (“The [Supreme] Court did not hold that a Grutter-like system would be impermissible even 
after race-neutral alternatives have been exhausted because the gains are small.”). 
 158. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., concurring). 
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race is.159  Most notably, however, he suggested that Grutter is too deferential to 
universities that “are no longer required to use the most effective race-neutral 
means.”160  By suggesting that any gains in racial composition must be statistically 
meaningful in order to be constitutional, Judge Garza implicitly adopted Parents 
Involved’s “minimal effect” rationale.  Applying this reasoning to Fisher, he wrote, 
“[t]he constitutional inquiry for me concerns whether the University’s program 
meaningfully furthers its intended goal of increasing racial diversity on the road to 
critical mass.  I find it does not.”161  Should Fisher reach the Supreme Court, Judge 
Garza’s opinion will provide ample opportunity for foes of affirmative action to 
continue to leverage Parents Involved to weaken Grutter. 
V.  ANALYZING THE FISHER DECISIONS AND LOOKING AHEAD 
Regardless of the various possible interpretations of Parents Involved, the 
Supreme Court certainly raised new questions about the ongoing vitality of racial 
preferences in higher education admissions.  Will the Supreme Court continue its 
deference to higher education on the question of narrow tailoring by allowing 
universities to continue experimenting with race-neutral alternatives, as both courts 
did in Fisher?  Or will the Supreme Court retrench from the deferential approach 
and only allow race as a “last resort?”  The facts of the Fisher case expose the 
contradictory holdings of Grutter and Parents Involved: whereas Grutter holds that 
universities “need not exhaust” race-neutral alternatives before turning to racial 
classification, Parents Involved expects that racial classifications only be used as a 
“last resort.”  The holding in Fisher, which aligns more with the more flexible 
standard in Grutter, conforms closely to the legal precedents of racial 
classifications in higher education admissions and steers a sound course for public 
policy reasons. 
Fisher provided a first opportunity to explore the legal question of what 
satisfies the narrow tailoring prong, and the opinions carefully negotiated the space 
between Grutter and Parents Involved by protecting the deferential framework 
higher education has historically enjoyed.  The courts in Fisher recognized that 
higher education is a unique enterprise, and both acknowledged the need to allow 
universities to experiment flexibly with various means to increase diversity, and 
reinforced the strength of the Grutter legacy.   
The Fisher opinions refocus the attention on Grutter in two ways.  First, 
because of the obvious similarity between two cases that deal with admissions 
decisions in higher education rather than public secondary education, both the 
District Court and Fifth Circuit looked primarily to Grutter as the governing 
precedent to be applied to the facts in Fisher.  In the absence of further precedent 
from the Supreme Court either abrogating or overturning Grutter, this analysis in 
Fisher soundly adheres to principles of stare decisis.  The District Court in Fisher 
extensively reviewed the facts and legal analysis of Grutter and consistently placed 
the facts and arguments by the parties in the context of Grutter to determine 
whether UT’s policies conform to Grutter’s constitutional mandate.   
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The second method of adhering to Grutter was more nuanced, however, and 
effectively addressed concerns that Parents Involved may have signaled a changing 
legal landscape.  By focusing on the distinctions that Parents Involved made in how 
it dealt with Grutter, the District Court in Fisher reinforced the ongoing viability of 
Grutter.  In other words, the District Court was able to leverage the Supreme 
Court’s distinction of Grutter in Parents Involved in order to strengthen the 
applicability of the Grutter precedent to the facts in Fisher (although the Fifth 
Circuit was less explicit in its treatment of Parents Involved, the effect is the same).  
Recall that in Parents Involved, the Supreme Court was careful to articulate that 
Grutter did not govern those facts because of the unique and special nature of 
higher education.  This distinction served UT’s interests in Fisher.  Furthermore, 
the District Court noted that the facts of Parents Involved represented more of a 
mechanized, non-individualized effort to achieve racial balance, which would be 
unconstitutional under Grutter.162  Instead, both Fisher opinions ruled that UT’s 
use of race was much more individualized and holistic, even alongside the TTPP, 
than that at issue in Parents Involved. 
Despite Fisher’s focus and adherence to Grutter, an important question 
lingers: Does the Grutter holding that universities “need not exhaust” race-neutral 
alternatives to survive strict scrutiny still govern?  Or did the District Court and 
Fifth Circuit err by not adhering to the new Parents Involved mandate that racial 
classifications may only be used as a “last resort” when race-neutral alternatives 
still exist?  Given these apparently contradictory holdings, federal courts must 
make a choice.  In the context of its adherence to Grutter, with respect to other 
dimensions of its strict scrutiny analysis, it follows logically that UT’s policy 
should be evaluated in the context of “need not exhaust.”  In doing so, UT would 
be constitutionally permitted to utilize racial classifications alongside viable race-
neutral alternatives.  When the courts upheld UT’s system, they not only satisfied 
the legal test outlined in Grutter, but also soundly reflected prudent public policy. 
The Fisher endorsement of UT’s dual admissions system recognizes that 
Parents Involved’s requirement that racial classifications be used only as a “last 
resort” in the higher education context is entirely unworkable in practice.  The 
District Court addressed this squarely in its opinion by recognizing that to adopt the 
position taken by the plaintiffs—that the existence of the TTPP rendered continued 
use of race unconstitutional—would be to put UT in an “impossible Catch-22.”163  
Adopting the plaintiffs’ position would have created an unworkable and unwise 
scenario: once a university experiments with race-neutral alternatives, it forfeits all 
opportunity to continue to use race as a factor at all.  Not only would this trample 
upon a university’s First Amendment right to achieve the educational benefits in 
accordance with its mission, but it also would seriously jeopardize the Grutter 
sunset provision’s broader goal and charge for higher education: to achieve a level 
of racial diversity so that race no longer needs to be a factor.   
Instead, the Fisher decisions noted that the wiser course is to allow universities 
to experiment with admissions strategies, some of which may be race-neutral and 
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others of which may consider race as a factor.164  Allowing various types of 
institutions to employ a wide range of constitutional means to attract and retain 
students from all walks of life will maximize the educational benefits that flow 
from diversity on campus.  The task of “building a class” is complex work, 
reflecting not just the admissions decisions of each student, but also recruitment 
policies, retention programs, and financial aid packaging philosophies.  Different 
universities will need to tailor their approaches to conform to their own unique 
diversity goals, their financial resources, and their progress toward achieving 
“critical mass.”  Courts will be ill-equipped to fashion these policies and will likely 
not be nimble enough to evaluate them on an ongoing basis as universities 
themselves can do.   
Suppose a university, in accordance with Grutter, continues to use race as a 
factor in admissions decisions, but also experiments with race-neutral alternatives 
in order to increase retention rates, such as a percentage plan for in-state students, 
new merit scholarships designed to attract students of color, or expanded on-
campus support programs.  The university succeeds in yielding more students of 
color and student satisfaction survey data and retention statistics show that students 
of color are having more success at the university than their counterparts several 
years ago.  This success builds upon itself in future admissions cycles; marketing 
helps to demonstrate that the university is a welcoming place for students of color.  
As these successes build upon themselves, although the university continues to use 
race as a factor, it comes to depend upon it less.   
The Fisher opinions rightly recognize that initial successes in increasing 
diversity on campus should not necessarily have to mean an immediate curtailment 
of the ongoing use of race as a factor.  To hold that it does (perhaps by applying the 
Parents Involved “last resort” language and its “minimal effect” analysis) might put 
universities in an impossible bind that may never allow them to achieve full racial 
neutrality within the Grutter twenty-five year framework.  Following the Fisher 
treatment of Parents Involved allows Grutter and Parents Involved to stand side-
by-side.  Once a university strays into a mechanical use of race, it violates narrow 
tailoring; but, so long as colleges continue to apply an individualized, holistic 
review where race is only one factor, their programs survive strict scrutiny.  This 
deference and flexibility acknowledges the need for universities to experiment with 
various race-neutral alternatives as long as they continue to satisfy a baseline 
constitutionality. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court may be called upon to decide whether or not Fisher 
sufficiently resolved the apparent ambiguity on the question of whether or not a 
university “need not exhaust” all race-neutral alternatives or only use race as a “last 
resort.”  If the Court resolves this ambiguity, it will provide substantial definition to 
the current question of whether or not there is current deference on the value of 
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diversity to educational outcomes and the means they employ to achieve it given to 
higher education by Bakke and Grutter, or whether Parents Involved signaled a 
new era of judicial scrutiny.  If Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin were to 
come before the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy will no doubt be the key to the 
resolution of this question, due to his previous opinions that the Court has been too 
deferential to colleges and universities on the question of narrow tailoring.   
Educators who endorse the use of racial preferences as the most effective 
means to achieve campus diversity are likely to applaud the Fisher opinions for 
steering a course that both neutralizes Parents Involved and protects the ongoing 
viability of the Grutter holding.  By finding that UT had satisfied its burden 
regarding narrow tailoring to consider in good faith race-neutral alternatives, the 
lower Fisher court distinguished Parents Involved as requiring only good faith.  
Will the Supreme Court be persuaded that Parents Involved can be limited to only 
requiring “good faith?”  Or does Parents Involved signal the Court’s interest to 
more strictly scrutinize this dimension of its narrow tailoring analysis?  Fisher’s 
focus on good faith was consistent with a deferential approach to higher education 
and acknowledged that universities are better equipped—and are a more 
appropriate forum than courts—to devise a fabric of admissions policies that 
includes experimentation with race-neutral alternatives.  Focusing the judiciary on 
good faith also allows courts to stay true to fact-based inquiries when constitutional 
challenges arise, rather than encouraging courts to second-guess the educational 
missions and admissions methodologies employed by particular campuses. 
 
